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Abstract
The lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident have focused on preventive measures designed to
protect nuclear reactors, andcrisismanagement plans.Although there is still no end in sight to the accident that
occurred on March 11, 2011, how engineers have handled the aftermath offers new insight into the capacity of
organizations to adapt in situations that far exceed the scope of safety standards based on probabilistic risk
assessment and on the comprehensive identification of disaster scenarios. Ongoing crises in which conven-
tional resources are lacking, but societal expectations are high, call for Òengineering thinking in emergency
situations.Ó This is a new concept that emphasizes adaptability and resilience within organizationsÑsuch as
the ability to create temporary new organizational structures; to quickly switch from a normal state to an
innovative mode; and to integrate a social dimension into engineering activities. In the future, nuclear safety
oversight authorities should assess the ability of plant operators to create and implement effective engineering
strategies on the fly, and should require that operators demonstrate the capability for resilience in the after-
math of an accident.
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W
hile the accidents at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl led
to the introduction of newcon-
cepts in nuclear safety, investigations of
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station disaster have not gone beyond
proposals for improved safety systems,
design standards, and management
guidelines for severe accidents. This
worrying lack of analysis suggests that
the Japanese accident can be reduced to
a sequence of failures.1
An alternative approach is to take a
step back and understand the event as a
chain reaction that, for more than three
years, has continued to trigger crises in
the context of a societal emergencyÑfor
instance, critical failures of water decon-
tamination equipment and multiple
radioactive leaks. An approach that we
call Òengineering thinking in emergency
situationsÓ offers a new perspective on
how to handle such an ongoing emer-
gency that affects an entire society.
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In the academic world, the Fukushima
Daiichi accident led to the re-examination
of ÒresilienceÓ in the context of a long-
term catastrophic event. The resilience
of a system is its intrinsic ability to adjust
its functioning prior to, during, or follow-
ing changes or disturbances, so that it
can sustain required operations under
both expected and unexpected conditions
(Hollnagel et al., 2005). The ongoing
events at Fukushima Daiichi demonstrate
how difficult it is for an organization to
transition into resilienceÑthat is, to
manage the consequences of an accident
in order to increase the likelihood that the
situation will be brought under control.
If organizations are to develop this
capacity to adapt, their response to a
threat must go beyond traditional stan-
dards-based approaches which involve
prescribed functions and procedures
(Hollnagel and Fujita, 2013). In particu-
lar, organizations cannot assume that
the availability of technical support
teams or material resources that can be
rapidly dispatched on-site is proof that
the organization can adapt to an unex-
pected, long-term situation. A pertinent
observation comes fromVayssier (2012),
who points out that even the guidelines
for the management of severe accidents
that have been developed since the
Fukushima Daiichi accident are limited
in their assumptions. For instance, esti-
mates of the reaction time to recover
from the failure of critical equipment
might not be realistic; scenarios might
not take into account areas outside the
reactor containment building; and, gen-
erally speaking, the assumptions might
underestimate the difficult material con-
ditions prevailing on-site after a disaster.
At Fukushima Daiichi there are, how-
ever, encouraging signs of change: Two
years after the accident, the International
AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)noted that
the plantÕs operator (the Tokyo Electric
Power Company, or TEPCO) had
adopted proactive approaches to decom-
missioning based on innovative technol-
ogies (IAEA, 2013). It seems that the
operator has incorporated feedback
from earlier incidents and used it to
improve engineering at the design stage.
One battle may be won, but the war is far
from over. Organizations such as TEPCO
have not yet figured out how to manage
ÒunmanageableÓ scenarios as theyunfold.
One answermay lie in the organization of
the engineering activity itself.
The Fukushima emergency as
engineering failure
The Fukushima accident began with a
combination of two powerful natural
phenomena: an earthquake, which trig-
gered the automatic shutdown of the
reactors and the loss of all external
power supplies; and a tsunami, which
then flooded generators (National Diet
of Japan, 2012). The lack of electricity
made it difficult to monitor and control
the state of the reactors. On-site damage
severely disrupted the operating condi-
tions in control rooms, as well as com-
munication between these rooms and
the on-site crisis center.
Although the sequences of reactor fail-
ures were relatively independent, shift
supervisors failed to transmit correct
and complete information to the on-site
crisis center, which led to shortcomings
in overall monitoring. Consequently,
reactors were left uncooled for several
hours, which led to the release of signifi-
cant levels of radioactive waste. The
Japanese investigation highlighted short-
comings in the actions taken by the fed-
eral government, Japanese nuclear
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authorities, and TEPCO with respect to
risk analysis, design standards, and over-
sight by the operator (National Diet of
Japan, 2012).
Fukushima recovery and
response
Since the disaster, about 800 cubic
meters of contaminated cooling water
are pumped from the reactors every
day (METI, 2014); some of this water is
stored in temporary reservoirs that are
not always completely watertight. A
decontamination system to remove
radionuclides was developed but has
proven extremely unreliable. To sustain
reactor cooling over the long term, the
IAEA recommended that TEPCO study
the conditions for a controlled discharge
of some of the stored water into the
ocean (IAEA, 2013).
In December 2011, the operator issued
a mid- and long-term post-disaster
recovery plan that was approved by the
Japanese government and has since been
updated (TEPCO, 2013). This plan pro-
poses the removal of fuel from the
spent fuel pool of Reactor 4 prior to
plant decommissioning. At the same
time, a research and development pro-
gramhas been established toprovide sci-
entific support for waste treatment
activities (IAEA, 2013).Work has already
begunon thedismantling of fuel rods and
is expected to continue for another year.
It is a dangerous job, given how little is
known about the state of the fuel rods.
To make matters worse, nobody is
quite sure whether the Japanese public
will support decommissioning, given the
repeated malfunctions, the uncontrolled
high level of contamination on-site and in
surrounding areas, and the failure of
water decontamination systems. In the
midst of this ongoing emergency,
TEPCO is carrying out an intense pro-
gram of on-site activities. The aim is to
contain radioactive pollution, regain con-
trol of the facilities, and complete decom-
missioning by the year 2050.
Elsewhere, members of the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) have carried out
their own safety studies designed to take
into account Òbeyond-designÓ and multi-
ple-failure scenarios. NEA member states
concluded from these studies that there
was no imminent risk to their operating
facilities. Although the NEA (2013) reaf-
firmed the validity of the defense-in-depth
conceptÑwhich uses multiple independ-
ent and redundant safety systems to pro-
tect against failures and unanticipated
eventsÑit is clear that the concept needs
a lot more work if it is to be effectively
implemented. All that has been learned
so far is that specific safety systems
should be strengthened to bolster safety
margins in exceptional circumstances.
The role of engineering
Engineering usually encompasses the
many and varied aspects of an industrial
project (technical, economic, financial,
and social). By extension, it refers to
the study of, or activities concerned
with, the modification or development
of technical applications that corres-
pond to a scientific field of knowledge.
Aparticular additional feature of nuclear
engineering is that quality control stand-
ards are extremely high (Cacuci, 2010).
Koen (1985) proposed a definition of the
Òengineering methodÓ as a strategy that
would offer the best possible change
using the available resources in a
poorly understood or uncertain situ-
ation. Given the constraints, it is no sur-
prise that engineers can only provide
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approximate answers; ultimately, soci-
ety decides whether the outcome is a
good one.
Time management underlies many
definitions of engineering. In a nuclear
crisis, time is an indicator of an emer-
gency situation. Roux-Dufort (2007)
and Albala-Bertrand (2000) argue that
emergencies reflect a twofold reality: a
scenario with adverse consequences is
very likely in the short term; and only
swift action and the massive mobiliza-
tion of resources may prevent damage.
Organizations affected by emergen-
cies are largely based on ritualized pro-
cesses, fragmented knowledge, and a
division of labor and skillsÑand they
aremade up of people whomay have dif-
fering opinions on what constitutes an
emergency. Consequently, their deci-
sions are open to challenge, both from
within the organization and from exter-
nal groups (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2010).
Thinking in an emergency
Engineering project managers are in the
hot seat. Their subjective understanding
of an emergency has to respond to three
equally important objectives: meeting
deadlines (when the threat is imminent),
finding effective and reliable solutions
that reduce risk, and avoiding the cre-
ation of new risks. Engineers faced with
an emergency have several problems
to solve:
. They donÕt know the full extent of
the situation.
. They face a critical lack of re-
sources, especially technical know-
ledge and practical know-how. If the
environmentbecomeshostile (in the
context of a disaster, for instance),
this only gets worse.
. Society expects a lot from them.
Deadlines must be met, and solu-
tions must be found.
Solutions based on only one of these
constraints can be incompatible, and
decision makers are often slow to adapt
when they have to make changes to their
initial strategy (Payne et al., 1996). At the
same time, decision makers donÕt care
for innovation when the risks are high
(Bonneville andGrosjean, 2006), despite
the fact that uncertainty offers an oppor-
tunity to explore new avenues.
ÒEngineering thinking in emergency
situationsÓ therefore describes the diffi-
cult activities that engineers have to con-
duct, with limited resources, in an
emergency that affects the general popu-
lation. What is an emergency? At a min-
imum, it describes the tension between
societyÕs high expectations that a solu-
tion can be found, and a lack of readily
available resources in an uncertain situ-
ation. We therefore define engineering
thinking in emergency situations as
(Guarnieri and Travadel, 2014: 10): Engi-
neering activities that are significantly
impeded due to a lack of resources in the
face of a societal emergency.
At its simplest, engineering thinking
in an emergency situation is an extreme
case of engineering. However, when it is
used as a crisismanagement strategy, the
goal is to foster the ability to innovate,
through specific organizational changes
that increase adaptability and resilience.
Adaptable organizations
Effective engineering thinking in emer-
gency situations is measured by the abil-
ity of an organization, in a crisis, to
modify itsworkingpractices andprovide
technical solutions that meet the
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expectations of society. This requires a
radical rethinking of how engineering
activities are organized.
The conventional solution, which
takes the form of a project framework
(including planning and control pro-
cesses that are materialized by ÒtoolsÓ
and ÒusersÓ) working within a known
timescale, isnÕt much use in an emer-
gency. A more helpful framework intro-
duces the concept of a ÒtemporaryÓ
organization (Lundin and So¬derholm,
1995). In itself, the concept of Òorganiza-
tionÓ reflects the Òexpectations-actions-
learningÓ loops found in interactions
between individuals in working situ-
ations (Packendorff, 1995). Furthermore,
incorporating social acceptability into
engineering not only increases commu-
nity involvement but also integrates the
activity into its environment by a redef-
inition of its goals.
A good example of this comes from
Fukushima Daiichi, where none of the
various systems that were implemented
to treat contaminated water were con-
sidered adequate. Engineers could not
see beyond a set of Òtarget ratesÓ for
water decontamination. Alternatively,
the objectives of the engineering activ-
ity could have been expanded to take
into account the expectations of the
affected populations. The target rates
could then have been defined accord-
ingly, thus opening up the option of dis-
charging waste into the sea. Expanding
the objectives of the activity poses new
challenges, so the temporary organiza-
tion must make it possible for new
resources to emerge, and must promote
innovation in order to meet the expect-
ations of society.
Traditionally, emergency manage-
ment has consisted of the deployment of
technical resources and the application
of established procedures. Engineering
thinking in emergency situations goes
farbeyond this. It looks forways to recon-
figure the organization of engineering
activities and associated management
tools, depending on immediate needs. It
can include changes to decision-making
procedures or the redistribution of roles
within the organization. In exceptionally
severe situations, it may even involve
deviating from legal requirements when
they are clearly not in the public interest
and limit the capacity of the organization
to adapt.
Engineering thinking in emergency
situations cannot happen if the organiza-
tion is not adaptable. Adaptability can be
assessed using three criteria: the organ-
izationÕs ability to widen the scope of its
activities andgoals to include theexpect-
ations of civil society; its ability to tem-
porarily change its structure to achieve
these reformulated goals; and its cap-
acity, through this new structure, to pro-
mote innovation that supplies resources.
Organizations that can fulfill these cri-
teria can quickly transition into resili-
ence in a catastrophic situation. But, to
be fully effective, organizations need
a broader conceptual framework for
safety management.
Resilience as a new safety
requirement
Nomatter howmany disasters there are,
and no matter how much experience is
gained, standards will never be infal-
lible (Quarantelli, 1986). It is difficult to
provide an exhaustive description of
dysfunctional scenarios, and easy to
overestimate the performance of agents
in a crisis (NEA, 2013).
Paradoxically,deterministicapproaches
to safety that attempt to anticipate every
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outcome can actually make a crisis more
dramatic: When the aim is to create order,
disorder is destabilizing. The transition to
resilience requires a quick switch to an
adaptive operating mode, which may
imply the reconfiguringof theorganization
and its decision-making strategies in order
to optimize the availability of resources.
Indeed, when the survival of critical infra-
structure such as nuclear reactors is threa-
tened, effective solutions must be found
even though significant resources have
been destroyed by the accident. This
raises the vision of a future in which
nuclear safety oversight authorities
require operators to demonstrate their
ability to implement an effective engineer-
ing thinking strategy in an emergency situ-
ation and, more generally, to demonstrate
their capacity (skills, expertise, methods,
etc.) to ensure a rapid transition into
resilience.
Fukushima Daiichi provides good
examples of what happens when the
resilience approach is not followed. On
a small scale, when they were faced with
the loss of electrical power and the sub-
sequent impossibility of activating relief
valves, workers found it difficult to set
up new power sources such as mobile
generators and car batteries. As a
result, the cores of the reactors were
left uncooled for several hours and
started to melt down.
On a bigger scale, engineeringmakes a
significant contribution to disaster man-
agementÑwhether through the restor-
ation of functions necessary to operate
reactors, or the design of ways to
handle contaminated waste. On the
other hand, a delay or failure in the exe-
cution of engineering work can be an
aggravating factor in a crisis, as it gener-
ates new risks and erodes public
confidence.
Beyond traditional safety models
The situation at Fukushima Daiichi has
highlighted a potential new function of
engineering. A topical example is the
work being done to decontaminate the
large volumes of cooling water injected
into the reactors. Traditionally, safety
has been framed by standards developed
in the design stages of a project. How-
ever, there is also an opportunity for
engineering thinking in emergency situ-
ations to enhance safety and contain
risks in an organization that has had its
key functions destroyed. Critical to this
end is how to integrate a social dimen-
sion into engineering activity and move
it beyond an essentially technical,
number-crunching exercise. Temporary
organizational changemust also provide
amanagerial framework that encourages
innovation in an emergency. This is a
strategic challenge, because effective
engineering thinking in emergency situ-
ations can accelerate the transition into
resilience for a system that has been
overwhelmed by a disaster.
Practical considerations about how to
achieve resilience through appropriate
organization raise questions about resili-
ence itself. Thinking about resilience
implies the modeling of changes to the
system facing an emergency. This is
where traditional safety models break
down. Although they offer some help in
describing hazardous scenarios and out-
lining measures to prevent failures from
propagating, they cannot represent the
state of the system or changes to it, par-
ticularly in the context of a long-term
emergency that continues even after nat-
ural disasters and official crisis periods
have come to an end. This may be why it
is difficult to measure the full extent of
events at Fukushima Daiichi.
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The shortcomings of traditional frame-
works should not be used as an excuse to
underestimateproblemsÑaphenomenon
that is particularly evident in assessments
of the epidemiological consequences of
nuclear accidents (Perrow, 2013). A new
conceptual framework is needed to fully
measure the impact of the events that
have unfolded since March 2011, and to
find better ways to think about the
Ònever-endingÓ disaster.
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